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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

R. OWEN NEERINGS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 89-0088

vs.
UTAH STATE BAR and
SYDNIE KUHRE,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, RONALD OWEN NEERINGS, by and
through counsel, John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah
Legal Clinic, submits the following BRIEF in support of his
appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendants UTAH
STATE BAR and SYDNIE KUHRE.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Art. VIII, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (1953 as amended).

On February 6, 1989, the trial court entered a summary

judgment in favor of defendants (T.R. 213-215).
appeal filed herein was dated March 3, 1989.

1

A notice of

(T.R. 240-241)

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Hon. James
S. Sawaya, Judge presiding.

The final order granted a

summary judgment to the defendants.
In a minute entry dated February 15, 1989, Judge Sawaya
stated that (1) the court did not believe that specific
findings of fact were required under the rules to support
the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment, but (2) the
court Mwould point to Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiffsf Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in
support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" for the
facts and law upon which the court based its ruling (T.R.
227).

Hence, this appeal is based upon the five (5) points

argued in the defendants' memorandum.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
(1) Whether the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency to
which the privacy provisions of the Archives and Records
Services and Information Practices Act apply.
(2) Whether applying the privacy provisions of the
Archives and Records Services and Information Practices Act
to the UTAH STATE BAR would be an unconstitutional infringement by the legislative branch into the province of the
judicial branch.
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(3) Whether there is a right to privacy protected by
the Utah Constitution, Utah statutes or decisions of this
Court.
(4) Whether the internal policies and practices of the
UTAH STATE BAR give rise to a standard of conduct to which
the BAR should be held accountable.
(5) Whether the public disclosure of private information gives rise to a common law claim of invasion of privacy.

DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS
A.

The controlling constitutional provision is:
The supreme court by rule shall govern
the practice of law, including admission
to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice
law.
I

Utah Const., Art. VIII, § 4.
B.

|

The controlling statutes are:
Utah Archives and Records Services
and Information Practices Act:
§ 63-2-60
*

*

*

(2) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two fundamental constitutional rights:
(a) the right of privacy in relation to personal
data gathered by state agencies . . . .
§ 63-2-61 As used in this act:
*

-k

-k

(2) "State agency" means a department,
division, board, bureau, commission,
council, institution, authority, or
other unit, however designated, of the
state.
(3) "Public offices" and "Public
3

officers" mean, respectively, the offices
and officers of any court, department,
division, board, commission, bureau,
council authority, institution, or other
agency of the state or any of its political subdivisions.
/\

/>

/\

(8) "Responsible authority" means any
state office or state official established
by law or executive order as the body
responsible for the collection, use, or
supervision of any set of data on individuals or summary data.
k

k

k

(12) "Private data" means data on individuals collected and maintained by state
government which is available only to the
appropriate state agencies for the uses
specified in Subsection 63-2-85.3(1),
to others by the express consent of the
individual, and to the individual himself or
next of kin when information is needed to
acquire benefits due a deceased person.
§ 63-2-85.3
/>

/\

/\

(4) Appropriate safeguards shall be established in relation to the collection,
storage, exchange, dissemination, and use
of data on individuals to assure that all
data is accurate, complete, and current and
that regard for the right of privacy is afforded to the individual who is the subject
of the data. . . .
§ 63-2-85.4 . . . The rights of individuals
on whom data is stored or is to be stored
and the responsibilities of each responsible
authority in regard to that data are as
follows:
k

k

k

(4) No confidential or private data shall
be used other than for the stated
purposes nor shall it be disclosed to any
person other than the individual to whom
the data pertains, without express consent
of that individual, except that next of kin
may obtain information needed to acquire
benefits due a deceased person.
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§ 63-2-88 (1) Any responsible authority who
violates any provision of this act shall be
liable to any person, suffering damage as
a result thereof, and the person damaged
may bring an action against the state to recover any damages sustained, plus costs incurred and reasonable attorney fees.
§§ 78-51-10, -21, -25, see addendum.
C.

The controlling case authorities are:
Barnard v. Chamberlain, et al., No. 882131, slip op. at 6,
F.2d
(10th Cir.
March 8, 1990)(the Utah State Bar is a
"governmental agency").
|
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah
1980)(there is a right of privacy recognized in Utah); see also Society of Professional Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F.Supp.
1308 (D.Utah 1987).

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, a recent law school graduate, took the
Bar examination in February, 1988, in order to qualify to
practice law in Utah.

Before the individual applicants were

notified of the exam results, defendant Sydnie Kuhre, a Utah
State Bar employee at all relevant times, told an associate
of plaintiff that plaintiff had failed the exam. Approximately, one week later, plaintiff received formal notification that he had failed the exam.
Plaintiff appealed his exam results through the procedures established by the Utah State Bar.

Again, before

plaintiff was notified of the result of his appeal, Ms.
Kuhre told the same associate of plaintiff that plaintiff's
appeal was unsuccessful.

The Utah State Bar notified

plaintiff approximately one week later that plaintiff's
appeal was unsuccessful.
Plaintiff sued the Utah State Bar and Ms. Kuhre for (1)
violating the Utah Information Practices Act, (2) violating
plaintiff's constitutional right of privacy, (3) negligently
breaching a duty of confidentiality established by the Utah
State Bar's own internal policies, and (4) tortiously
invading plaintiff's privacy by publically disclosing
private facts about the plaintiff.

The trial court rendered

a summary judgment for defendants.

From that judgment that

plaintiff now appeals.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purpose of this appeal, the following statement
of facts is present:

1.

The plaintiff and the individual defendant are

residents of Salt Lake County and the State of Utah.

The

UTAH STATE BAR maintains its office and headquarters in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

This action involves conduct

which occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (T.R.
78-79).
2.

RONALD OWEN NEERINGS is an adult and at the perti-

nent time as a resident of the State of Utah and Salt Lake
County and a recent law school graduate (T.R. 79).
3.

The UTAH STATE BAR is a governmental entity created

as an administrative agency of the Utah Supreme Court for
the purpose, among other things, of admission of attorneys
to practice law in the State of Utah.

The UTAH STATE BAR as

a governmental entity was created by state law, Ut. Code
Ann. §§78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) (Id.).
4.

The UTAH STATE BAR is a governmental agency created

and/or perpetuated by the Utah Supreme Court, (Rules for
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar, adopted by
the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1981) for the
purpose, among other things, of admission of attorneys to
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practice law in the State of Utah.

Suit against the UTAH

STATE BAR is authorized by Rule (A) 1. of said Rules (T.R.
79).
5.

According to Executive Director of the Bar, Stephen

Hutchinson, "ultimate control," over everything that the
UTAH STATE BAR does, is exercised by the Utah Supreme Court,
and that the UTAH STATE BAR is "completely subservient to
and accountable to the Utah Supreme Court."

(Aff. of

Hutchinson, 1f 7, pp. 4-5) (T.R. 63-64).
6.

Kent Kasting former Bar President of the UTAH STATE

BAR states that "the Bar is 'under the direction and control1 of the Utah Supreme Court," (Aff. of Kasting, 1f 3, p.
2) (T.R. 71), that the UTAH STATE BAR is "entirely subject to
and accountable to the Utah Supreme Court," (Id.), that "the
Bar and all of its governing officials remain under the
direct control of the Utah Supreme Court," and the "Bar was
created by the Court and remains subject to the [Supreme]
Court."
7.

(Id^, pp. 2-3)(T.R. 71-72).
SYDNIE KUHRE, an employee of the Utah State Bar,

was employed to perform certain duties for and is the agent,
servant and employee of the UTAH STATE BAR.

At all times

pertinent to this action SYDNIE KUHRE was and is acting
under the direct supervision of the Board of Commissioners
and/or of the Utah State Bar.

At all times pertinent to

this action SYDNIE KUHRE had the duty and responsibility of
following the policies of the Utah State Bar.

8

The UTAH

STATE BAR is responsible for the conduct of the defendant
SYDNIE KUHRE as set forth herein (T.R. 80).
8.

The plaintiff, RONALD OWEN NEERINGS, took the Utah

Bar Examination in February, 1988, as part of the process to
become a member of the Utah State Bar (Id.).
9.

The plaintiff, RONALD OWEN NEERINGS was required,

in order to be a member of the UTAH STATE BAR and to practice law in the State of Utah, to pass said exam (Id.).
10.

The UTAH STATE BAR employs the defendant SYDNIE

KUHRE as an assistant and/or secretary of the UTAH STATE BAR
(Id.).
11.

The plaintiff did not successfully complete the

February, 1988 Bar Examination.

He officially received

notice of his results from a member of the staff of the UTAH
STATE BAR by phone on or about March 25, 1988 (T.R. 81).
12.

Defendant KUHRE and Jan Fasselin have been friends

for over nine (9+) years.

Their friendship dates back to

when KUHRE was sixteen years old (Deposition of:

Sydnie

Kuhre, p. 38, lines 3-7)(T.R. 388)[hereinafter MKuhre!s
Dep.11].

KUHRE and Fasselin continue to visit regularly

(Id., p. 41 lines 14-17).

Additionally, KUHRE and Fasselin

speak on the telephone approximately once every one to two
months (Id., p. 41, lines 2-3). Fasselin sends KUHRE free
movie passes (Id., p. 49, lines 1-2).
13.

Fasselin and NEERINGS were associates.

They knew

each other and they worked on the same fl oor of the Regency

9

Theater (Deposition of R. Owen Neerings, p. 17, lines 17-25,
p. 18, line 6)(T.R. 387) [hereinafter,
14.

ff

Neerings! Dep."].

Earnest Hoffman, also employed by the Cineplex

Odeon Corporation, was an associate of both NEERINGS and
Fasselin during early 1988, when this action arose (Deposition of:

Ernest Hoffman, p. 5, lines 1-25, p. 6, lines

23-25, p. 7, lines 4-11)(T.R. 386)[hereinafter, "Hoffman's
Dep."].
15.

Before NEERINGS was informed of his BAR exam

results, Fasselin told Hoffman that NEERINGS had not passed
the exam.

Fasselin1s learned of NEERINGS' failure from a

person at the Utah State Bar (Hoffman's Dep., p. 10 lines
1-5).
16.

Plaintiff appealed to the Utah State Bar

Commission regarding the results of his Bar Examination.

A

hearing was held on that appeal on May 17, 1988, and a
decision was reached on May 18, 1988 (T.R. 81).
17.

The plaintiff received written notice of the

unfavorable decision on his appeal, in the mail, on or about
May 27, 1988 (Id^).
18.

Fasselin knew the results of NEERINGS1 unsuccess-

ful appeal approximately one week before the Bar informed
NEERINGS of the appeal results (Neerings' Dep., p. 21, lines
2-4).
19.

The UTAH STATE BAR has enacted no written rules

and regulations to protect the privacy and confidentiality
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of information regarding Bar applicants under the provisions
of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) (T.R.
82).
20 . The defendant UTAH STATE BAR has enacted no
written rules and regulations to protect the privacy and
confidentiality of bar results of persons failing to pass
the Utah Bar Exam under the provisions of Ut. Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) (Id.).
21.

The examination of applicants seeking to be

members of the UTAH STATE BAR and the admission of successful applicants is a governmental function of the Utah
Supreme Court.
pertinent part:

Ut. Const. Art. VIII, § 4 provides in
n

The supreme court by rule shall govern the

practice of law, including admission to practice law . . ."
That governmental function has been delegated by the Utah
Supreme Court to the UTAH STATE BAR.

Rules for Integration

and Management of the Utah State Bar, Rule (C) , § 10, (a)
provides, in pertinent part, the Board of Commissioners of
the UTAH STATE BAR "shall have power to determine the
qualifications and requirements for admission to the practice of law, and to conduct examinations of applicants;
• . . •

22.

The defendant Utah State Bar has established

internal unwritten rules and regulations to the effect that
negative bar results shall not be released to anyone except
the applicant (T.R. 198).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The UTAH STATE BAR (the Bar) is a state agency.

It is

this Court's administrative agency through which to carry
out the duties imposed by Article VIII, Section 4 of the
Utah Constitution.

The Court has designated the Bar to

fulfill many regulatory tasks, such as screening applicants
to the Bar, collecting mandatory license fees and punishing
those who practice without paying (see e.g., Ut. Code Ann §§
78-51-10, 21, 25 (1953 as amended).

The Bar is ultimately

accountable to this Court in every respect (see Aff. of
Hutchinson, 1 7 pp. 4-5)(T.R. 63-64).
As a state agency, the Bar is subject to and must
comply with the provisions of the Utah Information Practices
Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq. (1953 as amended) (the
Act).

The Act is to protect individuals from unauthorized

disclosure by state agencies of private information.

The

privacy portions of the Act apply to the Bar. Therefore,
the Bar's unauthorized release of private information
violates the Act.
Forcing the Bar to comply with the Act does not offend
the constitutionally mandated separation of the legislative
and judicial branches of Utah State Government (see Utah
Const. Art. V ) . There are many legislative acts that
directly and indirectly affect the administration of justice

12

without infringing upon the Utah Supreme Court's mandate to
govern the practice of law. Where the legislature acts to
protect a person's right of privacy, and where such an act
does not infringe upon the judiciary's constitutional
mandate, the legislative act is valid and enforcable.
The Utah State Legislature has expressly recognized
that a constitutional right of privacy exists (Ut. Code Ann.
§ 63-2-60 (2)(a)).

That right is violated where a state

agency collects confidential or private information about an
individual and then releases the information, except under
under certain limited circumstances (§§ 63-2-61, et seq) .
Therefore, where the Bar releases the private Bar examination results of an unsuccessful applicant, along with
the unsuccessful appeal thereof, to the applicant's
co-worker, the Bar violates the Act.

The defendant, SYDNIE

KUHRE, as an employee of the Bar, must also comply with the
Act with regard to information collected and maintained
regarding applicants for admission to the practice of law,
including the negative results of bar examinations.
The standard of care common to a profession or practice
is relevant to determining whether the professional or
practitioner owes the claimant a duty, and whether that duty
was breached.

The Bar had a "long-standing . . . unwritten

but strictly-enforced" policy to maintain the

13

confidentiality of Bar examination results (Defendant Utah
State Bar's Answers to Interrogatories, No. 12, pp.
5-6)(T.R. 197-198).

Therefore, that internal policy is

relevant to determining whether the Bar was negligent in
releasing confidential information to a person who had no
legitimate interest in that information.
This Court has recognized an individual's common law
right to be free from public disclosure of private facts
(see Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1980)).
The right protects information that would cause the individual shame or humiliation (Id.).

Whether disclosure of

private information qualifies as "public" disclosure requires an examination of the totality of the surrounding
circumstances (see e.g., Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc. , 216 P. 2d
571, 573 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950)).

Defendants1 release

of the plaintiff's non-passing Bar examination score, along
with the result of the unsuccessful appeal thereof, to
plaintiff's associate constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's common law privacy rights.
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ARGUMENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case is on appeal from a grant of defendants1
motion for summary judgment,
Rule 56(b).

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Consequently, this Court can affirm the lower

court's judgment only if, when viewing all the facts and
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, it appears as a matter of law that the defendants
are entitled to a judgment and the plaintiff is entitled to
no relief.

POINT I
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS
A STATE AGENCY
Where integrated bars are created by the state and
remain under state control, the integrated bars are state
agencies.

This rule holds whether the bar was created by

statute, or judicial order.

See e.g., Keller v. State Bar

of California, 767 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1989)(en banc)(as a
public corporation, the bar should be treated as a state
agency to determine how the bar may expend mandatory dues),
cert, granted, 110 S.Ct. 46 (1989); Wallace v. Wallace, 166
S.E.2d 718 (Ga. 1969)(the statefs integrated bar "is an
administrative arm of the court.
body."

It is a governmental

Id., at 725); Ford v. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections,

15

431 P.2d 423 (Okl. 1967); 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law §
7.1

A.

The Utah State Bar Is A State Agency.
In Utah, the Bar is a state agency.

Addressing the

issue of whether action by the Bar Commissioners is State
action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently declared:
It is undisputed, however, that the [Barfs
newsletter] is a publication of the Utah
State Bar, which is a governmental entity
established by state law and created as an
administrative agency of the Utah Supreme
Court. . . . [W]e find sufficient facts
alleged from which one could conclude that
the [Bar Commissioners1] conduct amounted
to state action. . . .
Barnard v. Chamberlain et al., No. 88-2131, slip op. at 6-7,
F.2d

, (10th Cir. March 8, 1990)(affirming Dis-

trict Court's Summary Judgment because the state action did
not deprive plaintiff of a guaranteed federal right).

In

Barnard v. Chamberlain, as in the instant case, the trial
court erroneously found as a matter of law that the Bar was
not a state agency.

The Tenth Circuit, viewing the facts in

a light most favorable to the plaintiff, concluded that the
Bar is a creature of state power, and the Bar functions as

M

Whether created by or pursuant to statutes or by court
rules, integrated bars have common characteristics of being
organized by or under the direction of the state, and of
being under its direct control; and in effect such bars are
governmental bodies.11 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 7.
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would a state regulatory agency.

Therefore, at least in
2
this procedural setting, the Bar is a state agency.
The Bar owes its existence to a combination of judicial

and legislative actions. The Supreme Court of Utah is
inherently empowered to control the practice of law.

In Re

Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary Rules on Advertising, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982).
Since 1985, this Courtfs power of control has been express.
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4.

In 1981, the Utah Supreme

Court, ffacting within the powers vested in it by the Constitution of this state and its inherent power over members of
i

the legal profession as officers of the Court, . . . perpetuate[d], create[d] and continue[d] under [its] direction and
control . . . an organization known as the Utah State Bar.11
Rule (A) 1, Rules for Integration and Management of the Utah
State Bar [hereinafter, "Integration Rules'1].

The Bar is

the agent and alter ego of the Utah Supreme Court,
While the Tenth Circuit treated its denomination of the
Bar as a question of fact, it based its denomination on
facts that cannot be disputed. The Bar does function as a
state agency. It plays roles that are administrative (e.g.,
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-51-21), judicial (e.g., Ut. Code Ann. §
78-51-10 (especially as to applicants the Bar decides are
not suited to practice)), and quasi-judicial (e.g., Supreme
Court Rules of Professional Practice, ch. 14). This Court
should declare as a matter of law that the Bar is a state
agency. In so doing, this Court would raise the Bar's duty
of accountablility to a level commensurate with the Bar's
power.
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designed to perform the Court's administrative
3
responsibilities.
The Legislature historically also contributed to the
creation of the Bar.

For example, the Legislature made

licensure a mandatory prerequisite to practicing law.

The

Bar is the legislative delegate to collect the license fees,
and to punish those who do not comply.

Ut. Code Ann. §§

78-51-21, -25 (1953 as amended).
The Bar is a creature of the State of Utah.

It is

empowered by state action -- currently judicially and
previously legislatively.

The Bar is ultimately accountable

to the this Court in every respect.

Because the Bar is a

creature of the State, and completely accountable thereto,
it must be treated as a state agency.
The creation of the Bar by the state, and the
accountablility of the Bar to the state are not the only
reasons to treat the Bar as a state agency.

The regulatory

3
See also
Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen F.
Hutchinson, 1[ 3 (T.R. 177-178) (taken in connection with
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, Civil No. C-88-0578), wherein the
Bar's current Executive Director declares:
The Rules for Integration and Management
of the Utah State Bar specifically state
that the Bar is Munder the direction and
control" of the Supreme Court. I understand
that to mean that the Bar, in all its activities
and functions, is under the Court's direction
and Control. . . . As to all activities [of
the Bar]. . . the Court retains ultimate
control.
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role played by the Bar is another.

This Court (and previ-

ously the Legislature) delegated important regulatory tasks
to the Bar. As explained above, the Bar is the agent
appointed to carry out this Court's constitutional mission
to regulate the practice of law.

Integration Rule (A) 1.

Additionally, the Bar administers the process by which Bar
applicants are screened for fitness to practice law, and
then are admitted if they pass muster.

Utah Code Ann. §

78-51-10 (1953 as amended); Integration Rule (A) 10(a).

The

Bar recommends the license fee to be approved by this Court,
and then it collects the fees.

Integration Rule (A) 10(a).

The Bar is charged with punishing those who would practice
law without paying.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-51-21, -25 (1953

as amended); Integration Rule (A) 20.
The Bar is involuntary in its membership.

The Bar is

the most visible agent acting to control the profession of
law in Utah.

The same cannot be said of any comparable

private professional organizations, such as the American Bar
Association, or the Utah Education Association.
The Bar's control of the legal profession is analogous
to the Physicians1 Licensing Board's control of the medical
profession.

Like the Bar, the physicians' Board regulates

the admittance, licensure, and discipline of medical professionals.

Utah Medical Practice Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§

58-12-26, et seq. (1953 as amended).

Also like the Bar, the

Board is subject to the control of a higher state power, the
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Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
Department of Commerce.

Id.

The Physicians' Licensing

Board complies with the Information Practice Act, however
(telephone interview with Dave Robinson, Dir. Ut. Div. of
Occ. and Pro. Licensing, April 24, 1990); the Bar does not.

B.

The Act Applies To The Utah State Bar.
By applying the Information Practices Act to the Bar,

this Court would (1) advance the noble purpose of protecting
individual privacy as expressed in the Act, as well as (2)
carry out the clear statutory language of the Act.
The Legislature was expressly motivated by its recognition of the constitutional right of privacy when it acted to
safeguard personal data gathered by state agencies. Ut.
Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended).

Defendants can

offer nothing that suggests that personal data collected by
the Bar is less worthy of protection than information
collected by other state agencies.

Forcing the Bar to

comply with the Act would protect individuals from, and make
the Bar accountable for, unauthorized releases of private
and confidential information held by the Bar.
In previous memoranda, the defendants have argued that
even if the Bar is a governmental entity, the Act still
should not apply to the Bar.

See e.g. , Defendants' Memoran-

dum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
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(T.R. 117) [hereinafter, "Defendants' Memo11].

Sorting

through the Act is somewhat tedious, but not complicated.
The clear language of the Act demonstrates that the Act
should apply to the Bar.
The Act defines "public offices" and "officers" as the
offices and officers of "any court, department, division,
board, commission, bureau, council authority, institution,
or other agency of the state. . . . "

Ut. Code Ann. §

63-2-61 (3) (1953 as amended)(emphasis added).

The Act

defines "state agency" broadly enough to include any "department, division, board, bureau, commission, council,
institution, authority, or other unit, however designated,
of the state." Ut. Code Ann § 63-2-61 (2) (1953 as amended) . These definitions certainly encompass the Utah State
Bar.
"Private data" includes information gathered by state
agencies which is available to the individual about whom it
applies, and to others in strictly limited circumstances.
Id., Subsection (12). Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-10 (1953 as
amended) and the Rules for Integration empower the Bar to
collect data, including examination scores of Bar applicants, in order to determine whether the applicants are
qualified to practice law in Utah.

Passing scores are used

by the Bar and by this Court to gauge an applicant's fitness
to practice law.

Non-passing scores are used only by the

Bar in order to separate the unsuccessful applicant from the
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qualified applicants recommended to the Supreme Court.
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-51-10 (1953 as amended).
have no other purpose.

See

Bar exam scores

The Bar applicant's exam score is

private data.
A "responsible authority1' is the state official or
office established by law to collect, use, or supervise any
set of data, personal or otherwise.
(8) (1953 as amended).

Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61

Since the Rules for Integration and

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-51-10 (1953 as amended) authorize the Bar
to collect information on Bar applicants, including exam
results, the Bar and its employees are responsible authorities with regard to those results.
Responsible authorities must prevent the unauthorized
disclosure of private data.
(1953 as amended).

Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-85.4 (4)

Unauthorized disclosure of private data

subjects the responsible authority to liability for damages.
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1953 as amended).

In the instant

case, the disclosure of plaintiff's unsuccessful Bar
application represents an unauthorized disclosure of private
data.

Hence, the defendants are liable for violating the

Act.
Defendants have spent considerable energy in memoranda
arguing that the privacy portions of the Act are applicable
only to executive branch state agencies.
Memo, pp. 4-13 (T.R. 120-129).

See Defendants'

Significantly, the Act

distinguishes between the records management portion of the
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Act and the information practices portion of the Act. Ut.
Code Ann. § 63-2-63 (l)(b), (d) (1953 as amended).

In fact,

prior to 1979, the records management portion of the current
Act was contained in a separate statute from the Information
4
Practices Act.
Plaintiff agrees that the records Management program of
the archives act is arguably applicable only to the executive branch of state government.
63-2-75, -79 (1953 as amended).

See Ut. Code Ann. §§
However, contrary to

defendants1 assertions, the information practices portion of
the Act is not limited to the executive branch.

In fact,

for the Legislature to limit privacy protections to only the
executive branch would violate the Legislature's own reading
of the constitution.

Distinguishing between the respon-

sibility of the judicial and executive branches to avoid
unauthorized disclosure of private information does not make
sense.

This Court should not read such a distinction into

the Act where there is none written.

The privacy portions

of the Act apply to every branch of the state government.
i

The Bar is a state agency because it was created by the
state, and because it is perpetuated by the state. Also,

The statutes regarding the archives and records service
were found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et. seq. (1953 as
amended in 1969). The Utah Information Practice Act was
found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-50-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended
in 1975). Why they were combined by the legislature in 1979
is unclear.

23

the Bar functions as a state regulatory agency.

Consequent-

ly, the Information Practices Act apply to the Bar.
Unsuccessful bar exam results, and appeals thereof, are
private data about individuals that are available to state
agencies for specified purposes.

The Bar and its employees

are liable for damages for releasing negative Bar exam
results without proper authorization.

POINT II
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT
TO THE UTAH STATE BAR
DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONCEPT
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.
Applying the Information Practices Act to the Bar does
not violate the Constitution of the State of Utah.

The

Constitution forbids the Legislature from encroaching on
powers exclusively reserved to the judiciary.
Art. V, § 1.

Utah Const.,

The Supreme Court of Utah shall govern the

practice of law within this state.

Id., Art. VIII, § 4.

Absent evidence that applying the Act to the Bar would
encroach upon this Court's authority, the constitutionality
of the legislative enactment must be presumed.

Lehi City v.

Meiling, City Recorder, 48 P.2d 530 (Utah 1935).
Where the Legislature acts within its constitutional
bounds, and where it advances the public welfare without
"embarrass[ing] the court or impair[ing] its constitutional
functions,11 the Legislature has not acted unconstitutionally.

Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 826-827 (1961)
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(opinion by Brennan, J.); see e.g., Short v. Demopolis, 691
P.2d 163, 170 (Wash. 1984)(application of consumer protection laws to law firms does not impermissibly infringe
upon the Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to regulate
the practice of law).
Certainly not every statute affecting the judiciary is
unconstitutional.
judiciary in Utah.

There are many statutes that affect the
In the instant case, forcing the Bar

to protect the privacy of Bar applicants would not interfere
with this Court's governance of the practice of law.

The

Act allows for the use and transfer of private and confidential information held by state agencies, so long as the
transfer is authorized.

The Act would merely impose upon

The Legislature sets a budget for the operation of the
state courts. The Bar itself was originally created by the
legislature, Utah Code Ann. §§78-51-1, et seq. (1953 as
amended). The legislature has also: required the courts to
conduct all proceedings in English, Utah Code Ann. §78-7-22
(1953 as amended); established the parameters of contempt,
Utah Code Ann. §§78-32-1, et seq. (1953 as amended);
established judicial salaries, Utah Code Ann. §§67-8-1, et
seq. (1953 as amended) and established the powers of every
judicial officer, Utah Code Ann. §78-7-17 (1953 as amended).
Other examples include: Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)
§78-7-1 (conflicts of interest), §78-7-18 (power to punish
contempt), § 78-7-9.5 (service of a judge in another
division or court), § 77-35-29 (disability of judges),
§77-35-29 (judicial bias or prejudice), §78-34-8 (powers of
judge concerning eminent domain), §78-7-16 (judicial powers
out of court), §30-3-17 (powers and jurisdiction of family
courts), §78-7-27 (appointment of judicial conduct committee), §78-2-1 (number of justices, selection and functions),
§78-2-2 (Supreme Court jurisdiction), §78-7-30 (privileged
nature of complaints and testimony), §78-7-28 (involuntary
retirement of judges), and §20-1-7.1 (process for filling
vacancies).
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the Bar the same duties of confidentiality and accountability that the Bar imposes by ethical rules upon the lawyers
of Utah.
According to the express language of the Act, the
legislature only imposes upon the Bar a procedure designed
to promote the "fundamental constitutional11 right of
privacy.

Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended).

The plaintiff in this case seeks merely to prevent unauthorized disclosure of private information.

Further, the

Act would impose no requirements upon the Bar beyond those
that the Bar already purports to observe.

Enforcing the Act

upon the Bar would not violate the separation of powers
doctrine.

Imposing the requirements of the Information Practices
Act on the Bar does not rise to the level of intrusion upon
the judiciary's powers present in cases cited by the defendants in previous memoranda. See e.g., Matter of Washington
State Bar Association, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash 1976), Ex Parte
Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980)(in
both cases, the legislative branch was a party to attempts
to audit bar accounts for evidence of malfeasance); Sharood
v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973)(a legislative
attempt to gain complete fiscal control of the state bar to
the exclusion of the judiciary); Pasik v. State Board of Law
Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. 1984)(an attempt to force
disclosure of information from the bar pursuant to a state
freedom of information act). By contrast, the plaintiff in
this case merely seeks to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
private information concerning him.
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POINT III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO PRIVACY IN UTAH,
The Information Practices Act clearly evidences the
Legislature's recognition of the right to privacy:
(2) In enacting this act, th£ Legislature recognizes two fundamental constitutional rights: (a)
the right of privacy in relation to personal data
gathered by state agencies, ajid (b) the public's
right of access to information concerning the
conduct of the public's business.
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended)(emphasis
added).

See also, Society of Professional Journalists v.

Briggs, 675 F.Supp. 1308, 1309 (D.Utah 1987) ("[I]n enacting
the Archives and Records Service Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-59, et seq. (1986), the Legislature articulated and
memorialized the following public polidy:

[text of Utah

Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) quoted as abova]").
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court in Redding v.
Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1195 (1980) recognized a "right to
privacy" in relation to governmental disclosures of personal
information as determined "by applying the commonly accepted
standards of social propriety."

Id.

By releasing his exam and appeal results without any
need or authorization, the Bar violate^, the plaintiff's
constitutional right to privacy.
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POINT IV
THE INTERNAL RULES OF
THE UTAH STATE BAR
CREATE A STANDARD OF CONDUCT.
Under the Bar's internal standards and rules it owed
the plaintiff a duty of confidentiality.

The unauthorized

disclosure of the confidential information breached that
duty.

As a consequence, the defendants were negligent.

The generally accepted practices within a profession or
practice are relevant to establish the standard of care owed
by a particular professional or practitioner.

Those accept-

ed practices may determine what duty was owing the plaintiff, and whether that duty was breached.

Meese v. Brigham

Young University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Crandall v. Ed
Gardner Plumbing and Heating, 405 P.2d 611 (Utah 1965);
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Company, 711 P.2d 250 (Utah
1985); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Wusich, 375 P.2d
364 (Ariz. 1962).

See Intermountain Farmers Association v.

Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978); Jorgensen v. Issa,
739 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The unwritten internal rules and regulations of the
Utah State Bar prohibit disclosure of private information
about Bar applicants:
All information regarding the results of
Bar examinations is kept strictly confidential. The only information regarding
the results of Bar examinations ever
publicly disclosed is a list of those who
passed the Bar examination. There are no
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written rules or regulations regarding
confidentiality of information regarding
Bar applicants and the results of Bar
examinations. Such information is kept
strictly confidential pursuant to longstanding but strictly-enforced policies
of the Bar.
Defendants1 Answers to Interrogatories (f 12, pp. 5-6, Aug.
12, 1988)(T.R. 197-198) .
The Bar's Executive Director acknowledges a "long standing" policy of maintaining the confidentiality of Bar
exam results.

Id.

That acknowledged policy creates a duty

of confidentiality.

The Bar's unauthorized release of the

confidential exam results breached that duty.

The subse-

quent unauthorized release of the results of the plaintiff's
appeal of the exam results compounded the original breach.
The Bar's unwritten policies are evidence of the Bar's
standard of conduct.

Therefore, viewing the facts of this

case in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Bar's
breaches give rise to a claim of negligence.

POINT V
THE BAR INVADED PLAINTIFF'S PRIVACY
The unauthorized release of plaintiff's exam and appeal
results invaded his privacy.

The public disclosure of

private facts is actionable under the common law claim of
"invasion of privacy."

Essentially, there are two (2) main

components to such a claim.

First, the information must
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have been sufficiently embarrassing.

Second, the publica-

tion must have been sufficiently wide spread.
This Court

!T

agree[s] with the general proposition that'

there is and should be such a right [of privacy] which
protects against any wrongful or unseemly intrusion into
what should properly be regarded as one's personal affairs."
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1980)(footnote
omitted).

In defining the extent of the right of privacy,

this Court stated:
It seems sufficient for our purposes
herein to say that what the right
protects is to be determined by applying the commonly accepted standards
of social propriety. . . . The right
should extend to protect against intrusion into or exposure of not only
things which might result in actual
harm or damage, but also to things
which might result in shame or humiliation, or merely violate one's pride
in keeping his private affairs to himself.
Id.

(footnote omitted).
In applying that standard, this Court cannot determine,

as a matter of law, that the unauthorized release to colleagues of failing Bar exam results and the unsuccessful
appeal thereof would not result in plaintiff's shame or
humiliation.

Further, such disclosure would violate any

reasonable person's pride in keeping his private affairs to
himself.

Certainly, the plaintiff's unsuccessful Bar

application was of "no proper concern to others." Id.
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In Redding, this Court held that the annual salary of a
state college professor was private information worthy of
protection under "commonly accepted standards of social
propriety."

Id.

If not revealing such a person's annual

salary is worthy of constitutional protection, then so is
the fact that a person failed a professional examination
after three (3) years of law school and extensive preparation.
Whether publication of private facts is sufficiently
wide spread to state a cause of action depends upon the
surrounding circumstances.

See Prosser & Keeton, Prosser on

Torts, 5th ed., § 117, pp. 857-858.

Significantly, broad

publication is not required when there is a breach of
contract, trust or confidence.

See Copley v. Northwestern

Mut. Life Ins. Co., (S.D. W.Va.1968) 295 F.Supp. 93;
Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, (Idaho 1961) 367 P.2d
284; Berry v. Moench, (Utah 1958) 331 P.2d 814;

See Note,

1959, 43 Minn.L.Rev. 943.
Further, there are other circumstances where something
less than wide spread publication may Constitute an
actionable breach of privacy.

For example, if the person is

not a public figure, then disclosure of private facts to his
co-workers, family, or neighbors may constitute "public
disclosure."
1977).

Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich.

Long ago it was recognized that ft[t]he oral dis-

semination of private matter may be as rapid as the wagging
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tongue of gossip and as devastating as the printed page."
Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 216 P.2d 571, 573 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1950)(disposition of privacy claim not reached due to
plaintiff's success on other claim).
In light of the nature of the confidential and compulsory relationship between the Utah State Bar and the plaintiff, the use of a billboard by the defendants to broadcast
the embarrassing information is not necessary to invade
plaintifffs privacy or give rise to a cause of action.

The

needless and unauthorized disclosure of plaintiffTs
unsuccessful exam and appeal to his work-place associates
constitutes disclosure of private information sufficient to
state a claim of common law invasion of privacy.

CONCLUSION
The Utah State Bar is a state agency to which the
Information Practices Act should apply.

Applying that Act

to the Bar would not offend the Separation of Powers doctrine.

The Legislature has expressly recognized a constitu-

tional right of privacy in the language of the Act.

The

Bar's own internal policies establish a duty owed to plaintiff, and breached by the Bar.

The Bar's unauthorized

release of the plaintiff's exam score, and unsuccessful
appeal thereof, represent actionable public disclosures of
private facts.
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This Court should reverse the lower court's summary
judgment and remand this matter for trial.
DATED this 11th day of May, 1990.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of MAY, 1990, I
caused to be mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
ROBERT REES & CARMAN KIPP
KIPP and CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Defendants
175 East 4th South
# 330
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
counsel for the opposing parties.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

JOHN PACE
BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM

78-51-10. Admission to practice law — Qualifications —
Enrollment — Oath — Fees.
The board of commissioners shall have power to determine the qualifications and requirements for admission to the practice of law, and to conduct
examinations of applicants; and it shall from time to time certify to the Supreme Court those applicants found to be qualified; provided, that the qualifications and requirements for admission to the practice of law shall be as
follows: each applicant shall be a citizen of the United States or a person who
has bonafidedeclared his intention to become one in the manner required by
law, of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and must produce
satisfactory testimonial of good moral character; have had a preliminary education other than legal and have regularly and attentively studied law for a
period of at least three years; and have passed a satisfactory examination
upon the principles of common law, equity, criminal law and the statutes and
practice of this state; provided, that until the 1st day of July, 1932, no examination for admission to practice shall be required of regular graduates of the
law school of the University of Utah. The approval by the Supreme Court of
any person so certified shall entitle him to be enrolled in the bar of this state
upon his taking an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and
of this state and to faithfully discharge the duties of an attorney and counselor
to the best of his knowledge and ability, and the payment of the fee provided
by law, and thereafter to practice law upon payment of the license fees herein
provided, subject to the provisions of this title.
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 10; RJS. 1933 &
Cross-References. — Fee for certificate of
C. 1943, 6-0-10.
admission, § 21-1-4.

78-51-2L Annual license — Fees — Disbursement of funds.
Every person practicing, or holding himself out as practicing law within
this state, or holding himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice
or carry on the calling of a lawyer within this state shall, prior to so doing and
prior to thefirstday of April of each year, pay to the Utah State Bar a license
fee in an amount to befixedby the board of commissioners of the Utah State
Bar with the approval of the Supreme Court to effectuate the purposes of this
title. These funds shall be administered by the Utah State Bar. All moneys
derived from license fees, previously transferred to the state treasurer and not
expended as of the effective date of this act, shall be returned to the Utah
State Bar for the purposes of carrying out the object of this chapter.
History: L. 1931, ch. 48,1 12; R.S. 1933 & last sentence of this section, means May 11,
C. 1943,6-0-20; L. 1957, ch. 175, § 1; 1965, ch. 1971. the effective date of Laws 1971, Chapter
173, § 1; 1971, ch. 215, I 1.
215, which amended this section.
"Effective date of this act". — The term
Cross-References. — Professional Corpora"effective date of this act," referred to in the tion Act, § 16-11*1 et seq.

78-51-25, Practicing without a license prohibited — Action
or proceedings to enforce — Exception.
No person who is not duly admitted and licensed to practice law within this
state nor any person whose right or license to so practice has terminated
either by disbarment, suspension, failure to pay his license fee or otherwise,
shall practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the public as a person
qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer within the state. Such
practice, or assumption to act or holding out, by any such unlicensed or disbarred or suspended person shall not constitute a crime, but this prohibition
against the practice of law by any such person shall be enforced by such civil
action or proceedings, including quo warranto, contempt or injunctive proceedings, as may be necessary and appropriate, which action or which proceedings shall be instituted by the board of commissioners of the Utah State
Bar; providing, that in any action or proceeding to enforce the prohibition
against the practice of law, the accused shall be entitled to a trial by jury.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a person who is unlicensed as an
attorney from personally representing his own interests in a cause to which he
is a party in his own right and not as assignee.
History: US. 1898 & C.L. 1907, S 112; C.L.
Extraordinary writs, Rules of Civil Proce1917, § 323; L. 1931, ch. 48, § 21; R.S. 19334k dure. Rule 65B.
C. 1943, 6-0-24; L. 1963, c k 196. § 1.
Injunctions, Rules of Civtt Procedure, Rule
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 63A.
§ 78-32-1 et seq.

